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Salt Lake City 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Supreme Court Clerk 
332 State Capital Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick, et al. 
Case No. 890205 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, Gold Standard, Inc., the plaintiff/appellant in the above-
referenced matter, submits this letter as a supplement to its 
memoranda and argument in support of its appeal. Since the 
January 8, 1990 oral argument, Gold Standard has discovered 
pertinent and significant authority bearing on an issue presented 
in the appeal. Accordingly, Gold Standard has enclosed ten 
copies of this submission and the authority. 
Specifically, Gold Standard would like to bring to the 
court's attention the case of In re Rafferty, 864 F.2d 151 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988), and the cases cited therein, in support of Gold 
Standard's fourth argument as stated in the "Brief of Appellant, 
Gold Standard, Inc." at 47-49. That argument concerns whether 
information obtained outside of the formal discovery process can 
be regulated by a protective order, based upon allegations that 
the information is work product, pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Gold Standard appreciates the opportunity to place before 
the court this newly-acquired authority, and respectfully 
requests that the Court consider In re Rafferty when ruling upon 
Geoffrey J. Putler 
February j,:^ U 
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Gold Standard's fourth argument at staIt'll 
reiterated during oral argument, 
Again, thank you very v\-n \ for VOL. 
matter. 
Very truly yours 
/ J? uames S . Lowr i e 
JSL/sk 
cc: Gordon T-. Roberts, Esq. 
Stephc- , Crockett, Esq. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _±/_ day of February, 
1990, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the aforementioned supplemental authority filed this day 
with the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, to the following parties 
of record: 
Gordon L. Roberts 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Stephen G. Crockett 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
150 864 FEDERAL REPORTER, 
Docket 
Title Number Date 
fCoca-Cola Co. v. Reed Indus-
tries, Inc 88-1319 11/22/88 
•Eichman. In re 88-1457 11/22/88 
Valcom Corp. v. Valmont In-
dustries. Inc 88-1295 11/25/88 
Copacabana Nightclub, Inc. v. 
Som Industria E. Comercio, 
S.A 88-1408 11/25/88 
Ahmed v. Department of 
Army 88-3212 11/25/88 
Joseph Becks & Associates, 
Inc. v. U.S 88-1288 11/29/88 
'Roberts. In re 88-1437 11/29/88 




















IN RE F 
Cite as 864 FJ2d 
In re Scott J. RAFFERTY. 
No. 88-5115. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia Circuit. 
Argued May 12, 1988. 
Decided Dec. 7, 1988. 
Former employee petitioned for writ of 
mandamus, challenging the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, 
Harold H. Greene, J., affirmance of magis-
trate's decision to place under protective 
order certain information obtained by for-
mer employee before he began litigation 
against his former employer. The Court of 
Appeals, Mikva, Circuit Judge, held that: 
(1) district court's decision was reviewable 
under collateral order exception to final 
judgment rule, and (2) magistrate exceeded 
scope of his delegated powers by placing 
under protective order materials not ob-
tained through discovery. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. United States Magistrates <s=>31 
District court's decision, affirming 
magistrate's protective order prohibiting 
transfer to third parties of computer disks 
of information obtained by party prior to 
litigation, was reviewable under collateral 
order exception to final judgment. 28 U.S. 
C.A. § 1291. 
2. United States Magistrates e=>17 
Magistrate exceeded his delegated 
powers by placing under protective order 
floppy disks of information obtained by 
former employee prior to litigation against 
his former employer; magistrate's powers 
were limited to supervising discovery pro-
cess, and materials in question were not 
obtained through discovery. 
On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to 
the United States District Court for the 
district of Columbia (Civil Action No. 87-
1521). 
Scott J. Rafferty, pro se. 
LFFERTY 1 5 1 
(1 (D.C.CIr. 1988) 
Guy Miller Struve, with whom Scott W. 
Muller was on the brief, for respondents. 
Before MIKVA and SILBERMAN, 
Circuit Judges, and PARKER, Senior 
District Judge, United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia. 
MIKVA, Circuit Judge: 
Petitioner challenges a district court rul-
ing that placed under a protective order 
certain information in petitioner's posses-
sion that petitioner had obtained before 
litigation and discovery began. The dis-
trict court order prevented petitioner from 
disclosing the information to third persons, 
including the Department of Justice. We 
find the district court's decision appealable 
as a collateral order under Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 
546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225, 93 L.Ed. 1528 
(1949), and we vacate the order. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On May 6, 1986, petitioner Scott J. Raf-
ferty was hired by Telco Research Corpora-
tion, a wholly owned subsidiary of NYNEX 
Corporation. NYNEX is one of the Bell 
Operating Companies ("BOCs") created by 
the break-up of the American Telephone & 
Telegraph Company ("AT & T"). Mr. Raf-
ferty was a senior vice president in charge 
of Telco's consulting division. The AT & T 
consent decree prevented BOCs from en-
gaging in any business other than local 
phone service without first obtaining a 
waiver from Judge Harold H. Greene. See 
United States v. American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 552 F.Supp. 131, 226-34 
(D.D.C.1982), affd, 460 U.S. 1001, 103 S.Ct. 
1240, 75 L.Ed.2d 472 (1983). Since Mr. 
Rafferty was unsure whether NYNEX had 
the authority to operate a consulting busi-
ness, he requested a legal opinion from 
NYNEX's attorneys; two weeks later, on 
November 10, 1986, NYNEX fired him. 
NYNEX asserts that it also terminated the 
consulting business at this time. 
The episode sparked an investigation of 
NYNEX by the Department of Justice, 
with which Mr. Rafferty cooperated. Mr. 
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Rafferty also filed an action against 
NYNEX alleging misrepresentation, breach 
of contract, unlawful discharge, and anti-
trust violations. The case was assigned to 
Judge Greene because Mr. Rafferty and his 
counsel designated the case as "related" to 
AT & T. The district court originally di-
rected that discovery in the lawsuit termi-
nate in November 1987, but that date was 
later extended at Mr. Rafferty's request 
until January 1, 1988. 
On January 29, 1988, NYNEX and Telco 
filed a motion for summary judgment seek-
ing dismissal of the entire action. Mr. Raf-
ferty's own opposition to this motion in-
cluded an affidavit in which he asserted 
that he had received four floppy disks of 
information "hacked" from Telco's comput-
ers indicating that NYNEX possessed doc-
uments that were responsive to his dis-
covery requests but that had not been pro-
duced. This, Mr. Rafferty maintained, was 
yet another reason to deny NYNEX's mo-
tion. The disks also allegedly contain in-
formation revealing violations by NYNEX 
of the antitrust consent decree. On March 
1, NYNEX filed what it styled an "Emer-
gency Motion for Hearing and Return of 
Property," seeking the return of the floppy 
disks and all information obtained from 
them. Six days later, the magistrate su-
pervising discovery, Patrick J. Attridge, 
granted this motion, ordering Mr. Rafferty 
to turn over the disks to NYNEX. At this 
point Mr. Rafferty had not had a chance to 
respond to NYNEX's motion. The magis-
trate then scheduled a hearing on the mat-
ter. Meanwhile, Mr. Rafferty complied 
with the order. 
At the hearing, the parties disputed 
whether Mr. Rafferty had obtained the 
floppy disks legally. Mr. Rafferty main-
tained that the day after he was dismissed 
from Telco, he requested copies of his elec-
tronic mail messages from a Telco manag-
er, who made the floppy disk copies for 
him. As it turned out, the information 
transferred to the four floppy disks includ-
ed some messages that were not Mr. Raf-
ferty's. NYNEX asserted that Mr. Raffer-
ty had gained possession of the disks in an 
unauthorized fashion by persuading a Telco 
computer room employee named Hollis to 
make the copies for him. Both parties 
agreed, however, that Mr. Rafferty ob-
tained the disks the day after his employ-
ment was terminated. Mr. Rafferty also 
disclosed during the course of the hearing 
that some of the material on the floppy 
disks was contained in the memory of his 
personal computer, which he had purchased 
from Telco at the time of his departure. 
The magistrate declined to resolve Mr. 
Rafferty's right to possess either the disks 
or the information within his personal com-
puter. In an order dated March 11, 1988, 
however, the magistrate sought to resolve 
the use of the disks and memory informa-
tion during the litigation. The order per-
mitted NYNEX to retain the originals of 
the floppy disks but required the return of 
copies of the disks to Mr. Rafferty. The 
magistrate then placed, for the duration of 
the litigation, all information contained on 
the disks, and all information relating to 
NYNEX and Telco in the personal comput-
er memory, under the protective order to 
which the parties had already agreed pur-
suant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). After Mr. Raf-
ferty's case against NYNEX and Telco was 
completed, the magistrate ruled, Mr. Raf-
ferty could apply to Judge Greene for a 
determination whether the disks and com-
puter memory data could be released. This 
meant that in the interim Mr. Rafferty 
could use the information only in connec-
tion with the pending litigation; he could 
not disclose it to third parties such as the 
Department of Justice. 
In a memorandum opinion dated March 
31, 1988, and filed April 5, 1988, Judge 
Greene affirmed the magistrate's order and 
denied Mr. Rafferty's motion for reconsid-
eration. Judge Greene found: 
This Order was entered after a hearing 
at which plaintiff was present and al-
lowed to state his position. Because the 
items under discussion related to dis-
covery in this case, consideration of this 
issue was well within the Magistrate's 
delegated jurisdiction. This Court will 
not, without good cause, overturn a deci-
sion taken after proper evaluation of the 
parties' respective positions. No such 
IN RE RAFFERTY 
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reason appears here. Therefore, [Mr. 
Rafferty's] motion will be denied. 
Memorandum opinion at 4. Judge 
Greene's March 31 ruling also denied a 
motion by Mr. Rafferty's counsel to with-
draw and a related motion by Mr. Rafferty 
to appear pro se. Later, however, in a 
memorandum and order dated October 24, 
1988 and filed October 25, 1988, Judge 
Greene granted the motion of counsel to 
withdraw and permitted the appearance of 
Mr. Rafferty pro se. 
Also on March 31, 1988, Mr. Rafferty 
filed a motion to enforce the AT & T anti-
trust decree, based on language in an order 
entered in United States v. Western Elec-
tric Co., 578 F.Supp. 677, 679 (D.D.C.1983), 
providing that "[a]n interested third party, 
whether or not it has heretofore been 
granted intervenor status • * * may apply 
to the Court for appropriate action" after 
serving a request for enforcement upon the 
Department of Justice. The motion was 
returned to Mr. Rafferty by the Clerk of 
the district court. On April 29, 1988, Judge 
Greene notified this court that Mr. Raffer-
ty's motion had been rejected because of a 
clerical error and that the district court had 
granted leave to Mr. Rafferty to file his 
motion. 
On April 22, 1988, Mr. Rafferty filed a 
petition for mandamus with this court, 
seeking a writ that would direct Judge 
Greene to: (1) grant the motion of Mr. 
Rafferty's attorney to withdraw; (2) permit 
Mr. Rafferty to appear pro se; (3) vacate 
the magistrate's order of March 11, 1988, 
which placed the floppy disks and informa-
tion contained in the personal computer 
memory under the protective order; (4) 
grant a hearing to determine whether the 
case should be transferred to another 
judge in the district court; and (5) accept 
for filing the motion to enforce the AT & T 
consent decree. 
II. DISCUSSION 
We treat the first, second, and fifth re-
quests as moot because the requested re-
"€f has already been granted by the dis-
^ct court. See County of Los Angeles v. 
Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 
1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979); Friends of 
Keeseville, Inc. v. FERC, 859 F.2d 230, 
232-33 (D.C.Cir.1988). Because the matter 
remains before the district court, any con-
cerns Mr. Rafferty has regarding the con-
tinued effect of discovery agreements en-
tered into by his counsel are appropriately 
raised in the district court rather than here. 
We also find it unnecessary to consider Mr. 
Rafferty's motion to transfer. Because the 
district court has permitted Mr. Rafferty to 
appear pro se, he can now properly submit 
a motion to transfer to the district court. 
At this time, there is no indication in the 
record that Judge Greene has conducted 
this case in such a way as would warrant 
the remedy or transfer. With respect to 
the third requested form of relief, we va-
cate the magistrate's orders of March 7 
and March 11, 1988, as well as that portion 
of Judge Greenes memorandum opinion of 
March 31 that affirmed them. 
[1] We pause at the outset to note that 
the decision placing the disks and informa-
tion under the protective order, and there-
by prohibiting Mr. Rafferty from transfer-
ring them to third parties, is reviewable 
under the collateral order exception to the 
final judgment rule embodied in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. As the Supreme Court found in 
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S.541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 
1225, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949): 
This decision appears to fall in that small 
class which finally determine claims of 
right separate from, and collateral to, 
rights asserted in the action, too impor-
tant to be denied review and too indepen-
dent of the cause itself to require that 
appellate consideration be deferred until 
the whole case is adjudicated. The Court 
has long given this provision of the stat-
ute this practical rather than a technical 
construction. 
Sec also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Rol-
ler, 472 U.S. 424, 429-32, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 
2760-62, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985); Flanagan 
v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265, 104 
S.Ct. 1051, 1054-55, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984). 
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The district court's decision meets this 
test. First, it "conclusively determine^] 
the disputed question," Coopers & Lyb-
rand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 
2454, 2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). As a 
result of the order in question, Mr. Raffer-
ty cannot disclose the information to third 
persons during the potentially quite 
lengthy litigation with NYNEX, and he can 
disclose it thereafter only after first apply-
ing to the district court. Second, it is "an 
important question completely separate 
from the merits of the action," 437 U.S. at 
468, 98 S.Ct. at 2458. See also Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 
2816, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (noting that 
collateral order must be "conceptually dis-
tinct" from the merits of the litigation). 
The order reviewed today is entirely inde-
pendent of the underlying wrongful dis-
charge claim. Whether Mr. Rafferty can 
disclose the information depends on how he 
obtained it, what its contents are, and what 
his legal rights of disclosure are. These 
questions are not intertwined in the slight-
est with Mr. Rafferty's complaint that he 
was terminated as a "whistleblower" for 
exposing NYNEX's possible antitrust viola-
tions. Cf Green v. Department of Com-
merce, 618 F.2d 836, 840 (D.C.Cir.1980); 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 
1108, 1117 (3d Cir.1986), cert, denied, — 
U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 487, 98 L.Ed.2d 485 
(1987). 
Finally, Mr. Rafferty's claim today would 
"be effectively unreviewable on appeal 
from a final judgment." Coopers & Lyb-
rand, 437 U.S. at 468, 98 S.Ct. at 2458. 
The disclosure issue is so far removed from 
the merits of the underlying case that it is 
difficult to imagine how Mr. Rafferty could 
even raise the issue on appeal. Even if he 
could, the public interest in the prompt 
disclosure of information, as illustrated by 
the prior restraint doctrine of first amend-
ment law, means that a slow, tortuous ap-
peal, filed after a long, time-consuming tri-
al, is not an effective remedy in this case. 
See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 
584 (1963) (noting that a prior restraint is 
invalid unless it "assure[s] an almost imme-
diate judicial determination of the validity 
of the restraint") (footnote omitted). 
Although discovery orders, being inter-
locutory, are not normally appealable, 
pragmatic concerns have led us in the past 
to find similar lower court orders appeal-
able, see, e.g., Tavoulareas i\ Washington 
Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1012 (D.C.Cir.) 
(permitting appeal challenging district 
court order that partially removed protec-
tive order), vacated on other grounds, 737 
F.2d 1170 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc). Our 
sister circuits have also noted that dis-
covery orders meeting the Cohen criteria 
are appealable as collateral orders. See, 
e.g., Southern Methodist University Asso-
ciation of Women Law Students v. 
Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 711-12 (5th 
Cir.1979) (permitting, under Cohen, appeal 
of discovery order requiring disclosure of 
identities of anonymous lawyers and mem-
bers of association who alleged that law 
firm hiring practices were discriminatory 
and who feared retaliation if their names 
were released). 
The case before us is an even more com-
pelling one, because what is really under 
challenge today is not a discovery order at 
all, but rather an order preventing the dis-
closure of materials obtained outside the 
discovery process. Mr. Rafferty, like the 
newspaper that seeks access to sealed doc-
uments in a judicial proceeding, wishes to 
disseminate information under a protective 
order to the public. Although there are 
concededly great differences between that 
case and this one, the separability of the 
issue of disclosure from the underlying 
merits of the litigation and the ineffective-
ness of appeal as a remedy are the same in 
both cases. It would certainly be anoma-
lous if a litigant in Mr. Rafferty's shoes 
who wished to distribute information to the 
government or to the media could not ap-
peal an order forbidding him from doing so, 
while the newspaper to whom he wished to 
give his story were able to appeal. See In 
re Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1330 (D.C.Cir. 
1985) (permitting appeal, under Cohen, by 
the press of an order that sealed doc-
uments in a civil trial following a pretrial 
protective order). 
We therefore find that 
court's decision affirming the magistrate's 
orders is appealable. 
B. 
f2] Having found that the district 
court's decision is appealable, we reach the 
substance of Mr. Rafferty's claim. It is 
clear to us that the magistrate exceeded his 
jurisdiction by issuing the orders in this 
case and that the district court erred in 
affirming them. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(1)(A) (magistrate's order may be 
reconsidered if "clearly erroneous or con-
trary to law"). By all accounts, Mr. Raf-
ferty possessed the items in question be-
fore litigation began; he did not obtain 
them through a discovery request. 
In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 
U.S. 20, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 
(1984), the Supreme Court held that a pro-
tective order entered after a showing of 
good cause did not offend the first amend-
ment, because the party "gained the infor-
mation [it] wish[ed] to disseminate only by 
virtue of the trial court's discovery pro-
cesses." 467 U.S. at 32, 104 S.Ct. at 2207. 
The Court emphasized that a "party may 
disseminate the identical information cover-
ed by the protective order as long as the 
information is gained through means inde-
pendent of the court's processes," 467 U.S. 
at 34, 104 S.Ct. at 2208, and upheld the 
order at issue in that case in part because 
it did "not restrict the dissemination of the 
information if gained from other sources." 
467 U.S. at 37, 104 S.Ct. at 2209. See also 
The Courier-Journal v. Marshall, 828 
F.2d 361, 364 (6th Cir.1987) (upholding pro-
tective order that "limit[ed] access only to 
specified fruits of discovery"); Anderson 
r. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 
1986) (holding that a protective order must 
not "restrict the dissemination of informa-
tion obtained from other sources"). 
We do not question the power of the 
district court to regulate discovery or the 
manner in which materials may be used in 
a
 litigation pending before it. But the 
magistrate's orders had the effect of pre-
venting petitioner from disclosing the infor-
mation in question, which petitioner had 
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the district obtained before the litigation began, to any 
person other than the parties to this case 
and their counsel. The March 7 order also 
required Mr. Rafferty to return the disks 
to NYNEX. The magistrate thereby ex-
ceeded his delegated powers, which were 
limited to supervising the discovery pro-
cess. The district court erred when it 
found that "the items under discussion re-
lated to discovery in this case." They did 
not. 
NYNEX and Telco argue that Mr. Raf-
ferty must be prevented from disclosing 
the information in question to third parties 
because he obtained it improperly. Mr. 
Rafferty contends that by using the word 
"hacked," he did not mean to imply that 
the disks were stolen, or that he was any-
thing but an innocent recipient of them. 
We find it unnecessary to resolve this fac-
tual dispute, or to reach the question 
whether Mr. Rafferty would be entitled to 
distribute the information even if he had 
obtained it without authorization. Cf. 
Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 
435 U.S. 829, 843-44, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 1543-
44, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Rodgers v. United 
States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1008 n. 
16 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing New York Times 
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 
2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971)); L. Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law § 12-21, at 
966 n. 6 (2d ed. 1988). NYNEX and Telco 
are free to seek any legal or equitable 
relief available to them to remedy the alleg-
edly improper obtaining and usage of the 
disks and information in the computer 
memory and to prevent Mr. Rafferty from 
disseminating them. What NYNEX and 
Telco may not do, however, is use the hap-
penstance of a discovery proceeding to 
place under a protective order materials 
not obtained through discovery. We inti-
mate no views on the questions of disk 
ownership and Mr. Rafferty's right to dis-
tribute the disks and information; we hold 
only that on the facts before us, the protec-
tive order was not a proper remedy. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The magistrate's orders of March 7 and 
11, 1988, are vacated, as is that portion of 
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the district court's memorandum opinion of 
March 31 affirming them. The case is 
remanded for proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
MID-TEX ELECTRIC 
COOPERATIVE, et al. 
v. 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY 
COMMISSION. 
No. 87-1675. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia Circuit 
Argued Oct. 7, 1988. 
Decided Dec. 9, 1988. 
Wholesale customers of suppliers of 
electric power filed petition to review as-
pects of Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission rule permitting utilities to include 
portion of costs of construction work in 
progress in their rate bases. The Court of 
Appeals, Stephen F. Williams, Circuit 
Judge, held that: (1) rule adequately ad-
dressed problem faced by wholesale cus-
tomer who decided to construct facilities to 
meet all or part of its future needs by 
permitting customer to submit forward 
looking allocation ratios that would reduce 
or eliminate payments for cost of construc-
tion work in progress by wholesale custom-
er; (2) Commission's decision to address 
regulatory "price squeeze" created by dis-
parity in treatment of costs of construction 
work in progress by state regulatory agen-
cies and Commission was reasonable; and 
(3) burden of proof required of wholesale 
customer seeking preliminary relief from 
anticompetive "price squeeze" was not 
based on reasoned decision making. 
Review granted. 
1. Electricity <s=»11.3(6) 
Orders of Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission must include reasoned opinion 
detailing those factual elements in record 
that underlie Commission's actions. 
2. Electricity <s=>l 1.3(1) 
In connection with adoption of Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission rule per-
mitting electric utilities to include portion 
of costs of construction work in progress in 
rate bases, Commission adequately ad-
dressed concerns of wholesale customers 
who sought to construct facilities to meet 
all or part of their future needs by permit-
ting submission of forward looking alloca-
tion ratios that would reduce or eliminate 
such payments by wholesale customers 
with plans to build their own generation 
facilities and subjecting wholesale custom-
ers who did not thereafter terminate or 
reduce service to sanctions for amount of 
underestimation. Federal Power Act, § § 1 
et seq., 313(b), 321, as amended, 16 U.S. 
C.A. §§ 792 et seq., 791a, 825/ (b). 
3. Electricity <©=>11.3(1) 
In connection with adoption of Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission rule per-
mitting electric utilities to include portion 
of their costs of construction work in 
progress in their rate bases, Commission's 
decision to proceed on case-by-case basis 
with respect to anticompetitive "price 
squeeze" imposed on wholesale customers 
of utilities which was created by disparity 
in treatment of costs of construction work 
in progress by state regulatory agencies 
and Commission was reasonable, given lack 
of uniformity in approaches taken by vari-
ous states to inclusion of costs of construc-
tion work in progress in rate base. Federal 
Power Act, §§ 1 et seq., 313(b), 321, as 
amended, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 792 et seq., 791a, 
825/(b). 
4. Electricity «s=>11.3(6) 
In connection with adoption of Federal 
Regulatory Commission rule permitting 
electric utilities to include portion of their 
costs of construction work in progress in 
rate bases, burden of proof required of 
wholesale customer seeking preliminary re-
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lief from anticompetitive "price squeeze" 
which was created by disparity in treat-
ment of costs of construction work in 
progress by state regulatory agencies and 
Commission was not product of reasoned 
decision making, as Commission ignored 
fact that it could order suspension of rate 
increase related only to cost of construction 
work in progress, which did not involve 
permanent loss of rate increase for period 
of suspension, but only deferral; rule re-
quired wholesale customers to show con-
crete, substantial likelihood of suffering 
imminent irreparable harm. Federal Pow-
er Act, §§ 1 et seq., 313(b), 321, as amend-
ed, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 792 et seq., 791a, 825/ 
(b). 
Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
Robert A. O'Neil, with whom, Wallace F. 
Tillman and Michael D. Oldak, Washington, 
D.C., were on the brief for petitioners. 
Samuel Sopper, Atty., F.E.R.C., with 
whom Catherine A. Cook, Gen. Counsel, 
and Jerome M. Feit, Sol., F.E.R.C., Wash-
ington, D.C., were on the brief for respon-
dent. Joshua Z. Rokach, Atty., F.E.R.C., 
Washington, D.C., also entered an appear-
ance for respondent. 
Alan J. Statman, Washington, D.C., was 
on the brief, for intervenor Southwestern 
Public Service Co. 
Albert R. Simonds, Jr., Washington, 
D.C., was on the brief, for intervenor Mon-
taup Elec. Co. 
Before EDWARDS, WILLIAMS and 
D.H. GINSBURG *, Circuit Judges. 
Opinion for the Court filed by 
Circuit Judge STEPHEN F. 
WILLIAMS. 
STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Circuit 
Judge: 
This is the third of a series of cases 
tefore this court dealing with the Federal 
Circuit Judge D.H. Ginsburg was a member of 
l he panel but did not participate in this deci-
1&7 
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Energy Regulatory Commission's propos-
als to adjust the timing of federally regu-
lated electric utilities' recovery of the cost 
of capital employed in construction. Be-
fore the adoption of the contested rules, a 
utility normally could recover these costs 
only after a newly constructed facility be-
came operational. It would accrue the 
carrying charges on the capital used to 
finance new construction in a separate ac-
count, "Allowance for Funds Used During 
Construction" ("AFUDC"), which appeared 
as a non-cash asset on the utility's balance 
sheet. When the plant went into service, 
the entire value of the investment, includ-
ing these accrued financing charges, would 
be added to the rate base. Only at this 
point would the utility begin to recover its 
financing costs from ratepayers. 
FERC's current proposal would allow a 
utility to include up to 50 percent of the 
costs of ''construction work in progress," 
or "CWIP," in its rate base as it incurred 
them and thus to start earning a return 
that typically would offset 50 percent of 
the associated costs of debt and equity 
capital. The utility in principle recovers all 
its costs under either the AFUDC or CWIP 
method, but CWIP allows a substantial 
part to be recovered sooner. 
A group of wholesale customers of sup-
pliers of electric power have attacked this 
rule on a variety of grounds, focusing pri-
marily on alleged anticompetitive effects. 
Although we find that the Commission has 
not been arbitrary or capricious in its as-
sessment of the potential anticompetitive 
problems and adoption of solutions, we 
grant the petition for review because 
FERC has not supported one aspect of the 
rule with reasoned decisionmaking. We re-
mand the case to the agency for further 
consideration of the burden of proof re-
quired of a party seeking preliminary relief 
from an anticompetitive "price squeeze." 
FERC's predecessor, the Federal Power 
Commission, opened the door to CWIP in 
1976 with an order allowing its use under 
sion. 
